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-w- ~w- ""Thy are tax authorities given powers of intrusion 
\ /\ I and enforcement that would be unacceptable 
T T in any other area of law enforcement? And why 
do we hear argument about ideas like a General Anti- 
Avoidance Rule that clearly breach fundamental 
requirements of the rule of law?
We cannot understand these questions without going 
back to some basic consideration of substantive tax law, 
because that is where the problems start.
A substantial part of the revenue of all developed 
countries is raised from labour or income taxation. The 
wisdom ot taxing people for setting out to earn a living is
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a matter that might be discussed if we were today 
designing a tax system from scratch, but income tax 
appears to be here to stay. Unfortunately, over the last 
century a sharply increased proportion of the workforce 
have become employees. Employees are sheltered from 
the inequities and inefficiencies of income tax; public 
servants and academics are employees and most lawyers 
and accountants are paid essentially as employees. It is 
therefore very hard to get any sensible discussion of these 
issues.
The root of the problem is that there is no such thing as 
income. It is an intellectual construct.
DEFINITION OF INCOME
The classic economic definition of income is net change
O
in wealth plus consumption over the period. But this is 
certainly not what is taxed. For a start there is no capital 
gains tax in New Zealand; in the UK it is charged on a 
realisation basis and not on an accrual basis, and 
significant assets, such as family homes, may be exempted. 
Even this definition assumes a distinction between 
consumption and investment expenditure, but as every 
self-employed person and small business knows there is no 
such clear distinction.
Dictionaries frequently equate income with receipts, 
but again, that is clearly not what is taxed. Part of the 
problem, perhaps, is that employees do tend to equate 
income with receipts, but they are aware neither of the 
arbitrary decisions taken between the receipt from the 
customer and their pay packets, nor of the extent to which 
their fringe benefits are taxable.
Unfortunately, employees have a seriously distorted 
view of remuneration and they dominate political and 
professional debate on these issues. There are two main 
problems. The first is that, as mentioned above, self- 
employed people have to make a number of decisions 
about how much of their receipts to plough back into the 
business, how much to spend on business equipment, 
offices, business travel which has personal benefits, car 
etc. In the case of employees these decisions are taken by 
other people and do not directly affect each month's pay 
packet. Employees are therefore largely unaware of the 
arbitrary nature of many of these decisions and of the 
difficulty in distinguishing between personal and business 
use of computers, cars, social life etc. When they see self- 
employed people making these necessarily arbitrary 
decisions, therefore, they accused them of tax rip-offs.
But if, for example, academics were to suffer cuts to 
conference or sabbatical travel allowances, they would see 
their terms of service as having got worse even though
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they would regard these matters as business expenses 
rather than taxable remuneration. So, employees too 
receive non-taxable benefits, which are part of the 
attractions of the job and therefore part of the reward 
derived from doing that job.
Secondly, many employees are unaware of the true level 
of their taxable remuneration even as technically defined. 
The rules relating to superannuating are extremely 
complicated, but there are other examples. To take a trite 
example, if an employer provides free parking in the 
building owned by the employer this is not taxable, but if 
the employer pays a neighbouring multi-story car park to 
provide parking, this is a taxable benefit. Economically, of 
course, this distinction makes no sense, but the important 
point is that few of the employees concerned are even 
aware of whether their car parks are taxed.
The end result is that employees have a completely false 
sense that there is some self-defining concept of income. 
As we have seen, there is not. But this misperception leads 
to some important consequences.
The first is that some senior judges today apparently do 
not understand a concept clearly understood by common 
law judges in previous generations today. Since there is no 
such thing as income, the only thing that can be taxed
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under the Income Tax Acts is that which is defined as 
income under the Acts. Yet today we find paragraphs in 
judgments, which the above discussion shows to be plainly 
fallacious such as:
'The objective of the Income Tax Act is to collect tax on 
income. Income is derived from the substance of a 
transaction, not its form. It is therefore necessary to have 
regard to the substance of a transaction and not just the 
form in which it is fabricated to determine the true income 
and the tax which is payable on that income. For either the 
tax authorities or the Courts to do otherwise is to thwart the 
objective of the Act', (per Thomas J in BNZI Investments 
v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 3 NZLR 
XXX para [102].
We can now see that although this paragraph expresses 
sentiments with which many employees, and hence policy 
makers, would agree, it is wrong at every step. The first 
sentence is wrong as there is no such thing as income and 
it cannot therefore be the objective of the Act to raise 
income on it. The sentence should read: 'the objective of 
the Income Tax Act is to collect tax. For this purpose, it 
defines a concept known as income'. The next sentence is 
wrong because it hinges around a non-existent idea, the
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'true income' derived from a transaction. As we have seen 
there can be no such thing as the true income from a
o
transaction any more than we could define a 'true profit', 
profit being measured simply by arbitrary accounting 
rules.
Tax enforcers, all employees, are therefore engaged in 
trying to identify and measure something, which they 
believe exists, but which does not: 'true income'. This can 
no more be pinned down than can a moonbeam, but the 
enforcers do not understand the fundamental reasons for 
this and become more and more frustrated and inclined to 
blame the problems they meet on the dishonesty of the 
taxpayers. The solution, in their minds, is ever increasing 
powers of intrusion, unilateral assessment etc.
The next challenge is that the process becomes 
interactive. Since only what is defined in the Act as taxable 
is taxable, people will always strive to achieve effects they 
wish to achieve in a way that minimises their tax liability. 
As taxpayers find new ways of acting just outside the 
boundary of what is taxable, so the government changes 
the definition of what is taxable to account for the new 
challenge. This is why there are so many Income Tax 
Amendment Acts each year and why tax law becomes so 
complicated. This argument is considered at length by 
Professor John Prebble in his papers 'Philosophical and 
design problems that arise from the ectopic nature ol 
income tax law and their impact on the taxation of 
international trade and investment' (1995) 13 Chinese 
Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 111-139 and 
'Ectopia, formalism, and anti-avoidance rules in income 
tax law' in Krawietz MacCormick & von Wright (eds)
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal 
Systems, Festschrift for Robert S Summers Duncker and 
Humblot, Berlin, (1994) 367-383.
Tax avoidance is thus an inherent aspect of taxing an 
intellectual construct, which has no independent 
existence outside tax law. Where what is taxed is 
something real with an independent existence, such as 
alcohol or tobacco, we do not regard changing our
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behaviour so as to reduce the amount of tax we pay as tax 
avoidance. The consequences of the inherent nature of 
income tax avoidance are predictable. First, the enforcers 
demand wider and more intrusive powers, believing that 
increased knowledge will enable them to deal with the 
challenges more effectively. Next, they take the power to 
make unilateral assessments and reverse the burden of 
proof so that the taxpayer has to prove that its income is 
not what the Revenue says they think it is. Finally, they 
bring in the ultimate weapon, the general anti-avoidance 
rule. This is equivalent to the abandonment of clear 
definitions of offences in criminal law or to giving the
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police the power to disallow any 'clever legal defence'.
All these moves are based on the fallacious assumption 
that there is some true income that each taxpayer receives 
and on which they should pay tax. This is essentially an 
employee's concept, but, as we have noted, not only are 
the experts nearly all employees but also the politicians are 
driven by the bulk of voters who are either employees or 
beneficiaries.
The same problem arises with the distinction between 
capital and income, especially since the capital value of 
something may well represent an assessment of its income 
earning potential, together with time preference and risk 
elements - the same ingredients that determine the
o
interest rate for a loan.
In McGuckian, the taxpayers owned a company from 
which they drew no dividend for vears. They then assessed 
the dividend they were entitled to and sold the right to it to 
a lawyer for 99 per cent of the assessed value. Had they paid 
themselves the accrued dividend it would have been taxable 
income. But the payment the lawyer made to them was, 
they argued, a one-off capital payment and hence untaxable.
Now, there could be genuine reasons for entering into 
such a transaction. If I own shares in a company in Russia, 
for example, I might sell the right to receive the dividends 
for the next year or two to someone else, perhaps a bank 
in Russia. The payment I receive would be a capital 
payment. But the discount I wrould accept would be 
determined not only by the risk factor but also by the fact 
that the payment I had received would not be taxed as 
income. And, of course, if I sell the shares themselves the 
price I receive will be based on the income I will be 
foregoing, yet the price is classed as a capital payment, 
unless I am a dealer in shares.
27
Amicus Curiae Issue 41 May/June 2002
In McGuckian, however, the transaction appeared to 
serve no business purpose and was doubtless made simply 
with the intention of pushing the receipt outside the 
definition of 'income'. The House of Lords had little 
difficulty in characterising it in that way and holding that 
the payment therefore represented income in the hands of 
the taxpayer.
But Lords Steyn and Cooke went further. They took a 
'broad' approach to statutory interpretation, talking about 
the 'spirit' of the Act and interpretations which would 
achieve parliament's 'intention'. Thomas J took the same 
sort of line in BNZI when he said at para [61]:
'For this purpose, the Court is required to examine the text in 
the light of its purpose, the scheme ojthe Act and, as Jar as 
it can be gleaned, the legislative policy. The resulting answers 
can be said to represent Parliament's intent'.
This approach is revealing. It reveals that die judges do 
not consider that any fundamental rights are in issue. 
Many of the same lawyers who in the context of criminal 
law and procedure will vigorously defend the requirement 
for strict legal definitions and for strict limits on police 
powers appear to see no conflict in adopting a completely 
different approach to tax.
This raises the question of a fundamental right to retain 
one's property unless deprived of it by process of law. 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights provides that the right to property does not prevent 
governments raising taxes. But we know that a right to 
property does not stop all sorts of government takings, 
such as expropriation to deal with 'hold-out' problems in 
road and rail construction projects. But all such takings 
should be in accordance with law and so should taxation.
The Petition of Grievances 1610 referred to the 
'indubitable right of the people of this kingdom not to be 
made subject to any punishment that shall extend to their 
lives, lands, bodies or goods other than such as are 
ordained by the common law of this land or by their 
common consent in Parliament.' Dicey made one of the 
three pillars of the rule of law the principle that no one 
was to be made to suffer in body or goods save for a 
distinct breach of the law.
One might have thought that there was no right more 
fundamental, and more important to more people, than 
that one should not be deprived of the fruits of one's 
labours except by law. But for some reason this 
proposition is completely forgotten by lawyers when we 
are dealing with tax. We get so far as to have judicial 
statements such as Thomas J's para [93] in 5NZ/, which 
he says:
•r
'No provision (or judicial doctrine) can ever enable taxpayers 
to predict with absolute certainty that a proposed 
arrangement will or will not constitute tax avoidance . ... at 
the margin, no bright line can be drawn between a valid 
commercial scheme and tax avoidance, and it has become 
unproductive to hanker after a level of precision and certainty 
which can never be realised'.
If such a pronouncement were to be made about crime 
there would be outrage and rightly so.o o J
There are in fact two practical solutions to this 
problem, which do not involve the step of abolishing 
income tax altogether. The first is to recognise that these 
problems get worse when we have graduated rates of tax, 
which encourage income splitting and other forms of 
evasion, and when we have exemptions and allowances, 
which encourage re-characterisation of income or changes 
in behaviour simply to avoid tax. If we opt for a relatively 
flat, broad tax scale in which a single relatively low rate 
applies to most people with no exemptions or tax breaks, 
the problem of tax avoidance is substantially reduced.
The second solution is to reconsider where tax 
investigative effort is directed. The focus on large 
businesses is misplaced, since corporation taxes are 
essentially withholding taxes. As long as we have income
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tax it is necessary to have corporation taxes at 
approximately the same rates to prevent tax driven 
retention of earnings, but tax evasion by corporations is 
not in the long term important, since it leads to higher 
profits, which lead ultimately to higher taxes for 
shareholders.
The evidence is that tax avoidance by large corporations 
and a small number of very rich individuals are heavily 
outweighed by widespread failures to report income at the 
small business end of the scale. Here the problems are 
straightforward concealment and fraud. No unusual legalo o
powers or extended definitions are required to deal with 
this, just straightforward investigative effort.
Consideration of the powers and processes of the 
Inland Revenue therefore cannot be divorced from the 
substantive law of tax and from tax design issues such as 
progressivism, marginal tax rates and comprehensiveness. 
Unless these matters are dealt with, any attempt to defend 
the procedural rights of taxpayers will be open to the 
challenge that it threatens to allow dishonesty to flourish 
and this challenge will be hard to deal with. @o
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